In recent years, interim measures (IMs) in competition law – whether in digital markets or more traditional sectors – have not been used systematically at the EU level. This is largely due to the perception that the legal threshold for imposing IMs remains difficult to meet, both substantively and procedurally. As a result, the European Commission (EC), long regarded as a pioneer in innovative competition enforcement, now finds itself lagging behind several national competition authorities (NCAs) and international counterparts in adopting rapid‑response measures. Against the backdrop of Meta’s recent AI‑related policy changes for its WhatsApp messenger service, this article explores the current landscape surrounding IMs and considers what may be expected going forward. 

GenAI chatbots on WhatsApp – why the strong interest of competition authorities? 

Meta’s WhatsApp, one of the world’s largest messaging apps, has rapidly become a key channel for deploying consumer-facing AI tools. Companies are increasingly relying on specialised AI chatbots for customer service on WhatsApp, while providers of Generative AI solutions also use WhatsApp as a major distribution channel to reach consumers. This activity has been governed by Meta’s WhatsApp Business Solution Terms (the Terms).

On 15 October 2025, however, Meta announced updates to its Terms that effectively banned third-party GenAI chatbots from the WhatsApp platform, effectively limiting consumer access within WhatsApp to Meta’s own GenAI chatbot MetaAI. The updated Terms took effect two months later on 15 January 2026.

This policy change prompted a wave of complaints to numerous NCAs and to the EC from providers of general‑purpose AI chatbots that had been operating – at least in part – through WhatsApp. Given competition authorities have broad discretion to decide which cases to prioritise, why were so many authorities willing to act to quickly? Three key reasons stand out:

1. AI markets are an enforcement priority: Competition authorities are actively trying to keep pace with the rapid evolution of the GenAI landscape. The EC, for example, outlined its initial reflections on competition concerns in GenAI in its September 2024 Competition Policy Brief. The rise of (Gen)AI and debates on its regulation are increasingly linked to broader concerns about safeguarding democratic values in the EU, as recently emphasized by EVP Teresa Ribera.
2. Enforcement speed matters more than ever: AI markets are still relatively young, with breakthroughs emerging almost weekly. WhatsApp’s uniquely dominant position in messaging markets raised competition authorities’ concerns that Meta could leverage this dominance to tilt the emerging AI assistant sector decisively in its favour and in very little time.
3. Ideal case to deploy IMs: The EC has often been criticised for failing to deploy the full range of enforcement tools at its disposal – including IMs. In its September 2024 Competition Policy Brief, the EC signalled its willingness to “use all tools at its disposal to address potential concerns in the generative AI and virtual worlds sectors, including antitrust, merger control and the DMA, to ensure that these sectors remain competitive, contestable and fair”. Meta’s WhatsApp policy change therefore appeared to present an ideal opportunity to revive the IMs instrument in a setting where the threshold for intervention could plausibly be met.

Fast enforcement, yet only the Bronze-medal for the EC 

On 9 February 2026, the EC sent a Statement of Objections (SO) to Meta, notifying the company of its intention to impose IMs under Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003. The goal is to prevent Meta’s updated Terms from causing serious and irreparable harm on the growing market for AI assistants, following concerns that Meta may have abused its allegedly dominant position in the EEA market for consumer communication applications by refusing GenAI chatbot providers access to WhatsApp (see EC press release).

The EC opened proceedings on 4 December 2025, meaning it took the EC just over two months to issue its SO, remarkably fast by EU antitrust standards. If ultimately imposed, this would be the EC’s first use of IMs since the 2019 Broadcom case and only the second such intervention under Regulation 1/2003.

However, Italy is excluded from the scope of the SO, as the Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM) had already issued IMs against Meta for the same conduct on 24 December 2025, roughly a month after extending the scope of an earlier investigation to include Meta’s updated Terms (see AGCM press release). To comply with the AGCM’s IMs, Meta amended its Terms to introduce a pricing scheme for third-party GenAI chatbots using WhatsApp in Italy. 

Meanwhile, in Brazil, the Brazilian Competition Authority (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, CADE) issued IMs against Meta on 12 January 2026 (see CADE press release), although a federal court suspended them shortly thereafter following an application by Meta.

Revising Regulation 1/2003 – what comes next for interim measures?

This case highlights a fundamental challenge for the EC, especially in digital markets: even where the EC moves very quickly, NCAs often move even faster due to lower procedural and substantial thresholds. This has led to the increasingly common, though artificial, practice of carving-out specific EU Member States from EU-level proceedings. Even though the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has accepted such carve-outs in the past, it is far from ideal for companies to face parallel investigations for the same conduct.

The EC is currently preparing a legislative proposal to revise Regulation 1/2003, which is expected to be adopted in Q3 of 2026 (see our article here). As part of this work, the EC has thoroughly analysed the differences between its own approach to IMs and that of EU Member States (see COM(2024) 394 final). While it appears unlikely that the EC will significantly lower the substantive threshold for IMs, it may propose shorter procedural steps, aligning its processes more closely with those of faster-moving NCAs. At present, the EC largely follows the same procedural steps required in full infringement proceedings (i.e., access to file, written proceedings, and oral hearings). This structure makes rapid intervention difficult, particularly when compared with the AGCM’s speed in the present case.

EC officials have repeatedly expressed frustration with the cumbersome nature of IMs under the current framework. Even if the Meta case ultimately leads to IMs being imposed, the experience may give the necessary political and institutional impetus to make Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003 more effective. Possible reforms could include: 

• Streamlining the procedure by combining or simplifying certain steps.
• For particularly urgent cases, using a written procedure only, provided that defendants’ rights of defense are safeguarded.
• Clarifying timelines and evidentiary standards to reduce delays. 

Such reforms of Regulation 1/2003 could significantly enhance the EC’s ability to intervene swiftly in fast-moving markets and would promote global convergence in the use of IMs. This, in turn, would reinforce the effectiveness of competition law enforcement not only in the digital, but across the broader economy.